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Executiye Summa~
Crime, a perennial problem in Papua New Guinea, is once
again the center of attention, due to an upsurge in violent
or spectacular incidents in both urban and rural areas.
Domestic and foreign confidence in the government's ability
to control organized gangs, militant landowners,
Bougainville rebels, corrupt politicians and other
malefactors is fading. The level of violence is rising,
prompting foreign governments to issue warnings and Prime
Minister Namaliu to unveil a series of proposals to crack
down on criminals. The 1984 Clifford Report, a major study
sponsored by both government and private enterprise in Papua
New Guinea, advocated increased efforts to support
community-based policing, but there is no indication the
Government is moving in that direction. Both Western and
Papua New Guinean commentators consider the imported
Australian legal system bequeathed to Papua New Guinea to be
alien to its numerous fragmented communities, leading to
tension between customary and Western means of resolving
conflict. Australia has embarked upon a major effort to
strengthen the Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary (RPNGC),
the nation's one and only police force, through the
provision of technical assistance, especially training. PM
Namaliu indicated in early 1991 that he would like the
program expanded even further, despite a doubling of
advisors undertaken in late 1990.
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Australian aid to the RPNGC must be viewed within the
context of Australian budgetary support (cash grants) to
Papua New Guinea, traditionally by far the most important
form of Australian aid. The shift to project aid,
symbolized in part by the RPNGC program, restores a measure
of Australian supervision and accountability. Australian
involvement with the RPNGC, of course, predated
independence, so it was natural for Australia to continue to
play an important role following independence. This
assistance included secondment of Australian police to
RPNGC posts, provision of equipment, and training courses.
These elements all reappear in current Australian relations
with the RPNGC, although expatriates are now primarily
posted as advisors instead of as line officers. The police
assistance program has expanded steadily since its 1988
start, to levels exceeding the highest initial project
design proposal, and is occupying an increasingly large
proportion of total Australian project assistance to Papua
New Guinea.
There are four principal strategies Papua New Guinea
can embark upon to improve its capability to fight crime:
re-allocate domestic resources to the RPNGC; obtain
additional Australian aid; focus on community-based
policing; and devolve police responsibilities to village
peace officers. The Papua New Guinean government probably
will adopt a syncretic strategy involving elements of all
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four, although it will emphasize obtaining additional aid
and try to avoid devolving police functions.
The difficulty the RPNGC is experiencing in
controlling crime reflects the Papua New Guinean transition
from Western to Melanesian institutions. The RPNGC, for
example, can be viewed as having a primary mission of
serving as an agent for the extension of centralized
government, with crime-fighting as only a secondary
activity. Individual officers may also view their jobs
primarily as means of access to the cash economy. The RPNGC
represents an institution still in the making. Not
unexpectedly, it displays a variety of weaknesses which
Australian assistance will have difficulty addressing.
Australian national interests nonetheless dictate continued
efforts to support the RPNGC, in both its official mission
of fighting crime and its disguised mission of extending
central government control.
Introduction
This paper examines the expanding Australian technical
and advisory support for the RPNGC, Papua New Guinea's one
and only police force. This Introduction will discuss the
strategic setting for Australian involvement with the RPNGC.
The following four sections describe the origins and nature
of crime in Papua New Guinea; the inexorable shift in
Australian aid from untied budgetary support to project
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assistance, with the RPNGC effort assuming an increasingly
important role as a showcase; the potential problem for
Australian policy posed by RPNGC human rights violations;
and alternative strategies Papua New Guinea could follow in
attempting to strengthen police effectiveness. The author
concludes that human rights is not a significant constraint
on Australian police aid at present; that the interests of
both the Australian and Papua New Guinean governments
coincide in strengthening the RPNGC as an instrument for
central government control, regardless of its effectiveness
in maintaining law and order; and that Australian police aid
probably will continue at existing levels, but cannot be
further expanded without drawing criticism for claiming too
much of the project assistance budget.
Papua New Guinea is under siege--not from without, but
from within. The ongoing secessionist rebellion on
Bougainville island, estimated to have cost more than 200
lives by now, is only the most spectacular manifestation of
a more general deterioration in government authority and
social control. "Rascal gangs" of criminals operating in
urban areas, particularly the capital of Port Moresby,
demonstrate increasing sophistication and audacity in
carrying out thefts from and attacks upon both Papua New
Guineans and expatriate residents (Harris 1988). Inter-
tribal fighting, particularly in the Highlands provinces of
central Papua New Guinea, shows little sign of abating in
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intensity or frequency. Landowners are increasingly using
threats or force itself to press their demands for higher
compensation for the use of their property, even when needed
for public purposes. Lawlessness is taking an increasing
toll on the national economy. The Australian International
Development Assistance Bureau (AIDAB) considers security
problems to be one of the greatest barriers to non-mining
investment (AIDAB 1990c, viii), as well as an obstacle to
tourism development (Ibid, 33).
Australia has a number of good reasons to help the
Papua New Guinea government combat these threats to
political stability and economic development:
-- Australia provides the largest amount of bilateral
foreign aid donor to Papua New Guinea--at least A$ 295
million dollars per year through fiscal year 1993/94 (AIDAB
1989a, 11) Much of this aid is provided as a cash
transfer. The effectiveness of this aid is jeopardized by
criminal activity, calling into question whether Australian
taxpayers should continue to underwrite subsidies with
limited impact on development.
Australia has the greatest number of expatriate citizens
in Papua New Guinea--over fifteen thousand, according to a
1989 report (DFAT 1989a, 11). The Australian government
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needs to be perceived as supporting measures to protect
them.
-- Unlike other donors, Australia has already assumed a
major role in strengthening the Royal Papua New Guinea
Constabulary (RPNGC), the nation's first line of defense
against lawlessness. This gives it a vested stake in RPNGC
effectiveness against crime. If crime continues to increase
despite Australian assistance, the effectiveness of the
program will be called into question, casting a shadow over
the remainder of the Australian aid projects either planned
or underway. Australia is more or less on its own in
attempting to bolster the RPNGC. The United States
government, for example, would be unable to mount a similar
effort because section 660 of the Foreign Assistance Act of
1962 prohibits aid to foreign police forces, except for such
narrowly-circumscribed activities as anti-terrorist, anti-
narcotics and maritime law enforcement cooperation.
These rationales for Australian cooperation with the
RPNGC are all premised upon the underlying strategic
Australian interest in Papua New Guinea. Australia has been
concerned about Papua New Guinea since its early colonial
days because a hostile power operating from it could menace
not only Australia's sea routes to Asia and Europe, but
northern Australia itself. Australian colonists pressured
Great Britain into taking over Papua--the southern portion
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of Papua New Guinea--in the 1880s. Australia, newly unified
itself as a federal state, assumed responsibility for
administering Papua from the British in 1906. The
Australians then wrested the northern and archipelagic
sector called New Guinea from the Germans at the outset of
World War I. Only American intervention prevented the
Japanese from seizing Papua New Guinea and threatening
Australia itself in World War II. Darwin, the capital of
Australia's Northern Territory, was actually bombed by the
Japanese from bases in what became Papua New Guinea,
reinforcing Australian respect for the latter's strategic
value.
Following World War II, Australian colonial authorities
began to re-orient their efforts toward helping Papua New
Guinea forge a nation out of a people with more than 800
separate languages, but without much expectation of success.
Independence, in 1975, came too soon for this task to be
fully achieved. Unlike many other colonial peoples, the
Papua New Guineans did not have the unifying experience of
fighting side-by-side to toss out their overlords; the
Australians, instead, accelerated the transfer of authority,
despite opposition from some Papua New Guineans who sought a
longer transition to independence. The Australian
government agreed to underwrite Papua New Guinea's post-
independence budget with a substantial annual cash subsidy
("budgetary support") that continues today. The bilateral
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relationship therefore remains relatively warm, although
Papua New Guineans remain acutely sensitive to any
suggestion that Australia knows best how to solve their
problems.
Budgetary support exemplifies Australian determination
to safeguard its security interests in Papua New Guinea,
whether the threat comes from within or without. To this
end it is also strengthening its already-close relations
with the principal Papua New Guinean security institutions.
Australia doubled the size of its police assistance program
in late 1990, even as doubts about human rights abuses by
the RPNGC mounted. The RPNGC itself is an unusually highly
centralized police force. All of its 4800-odd members (Geno
1991, 16) are national, rather than provincial or local,
employees. They are charged with policing some 3.5 million
Papua New Guineans, spread out over immense regions of
trackless forest, swamps and mountains. There are no
provincial or local police forces, thus, the prevailing
assumption is that the maintenance of law and order is a
national government, rather than local, responsibility. The
RPNGC quells rural and urban disturbances too large to
handle with local resources by calling upon its 450 members
organized into 14 police mobile squads (AIDAB Assistance
1991). The weak RPNGC presence outside principal towns and
cities, however, ensures that traditional mechanisms of
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resolving conflict--including inter-tribal warfare and
retributive killings--remain the court of last resort.
The RPNGC competes with the Papua New Guinea Defence
Force (PNGDF) for funding, prestige and political influence.
The PNGDF backs up the RPNGC when the latter's resources
are insufficient to restore law and order. Australia and
Papua New Guinea are now reviewing how the PNGDF could
redirect its mission so as to fight crime on a continuing,
rather than episodic, basis. The PNGDF is variously
estimated to have 3200 members (Anderson 1990, 31); 3500
(ADOD 1989, 4); or over 4000 (Wesley-Smith 1991, 194). The
disparity may be explained in part by a reported decision by
Papua New Guinea to recruit 450 additional troops, financed
by Australia, due to the Bougainville crisis (Anderson 1990,
31). The PNGDF traces its origins to armed units raised
during World War II. They were disbanded after the war, but
Australia organized the Pacific Islands Regiment as an
integral unit of the Australian Army in 1951 to serve as an
indigenous armed force. Australia recruited, trained, and
equipped its members throughout the colonial period and
retains close ties following independence. For example, the
PNGDF can order military supplies through Australian
military channels under a January 1977 bilateral agreement
(ADOD 1989, Annex A). Australia has doubled its military
aid to Papua New Guinea to approximately A$ 54 million in
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fi~cal year 1990/1991 (AIDAB 1990e, 23) since the
Bougainville crisis arose in late 1989.
The Papua New Guinea government assigns most internal
security functions to three separate ministries: Police;
Correctional Institutional Services (CIS); and Justice. It
thereby accommodates three, rather than one, Members of
Parliament as Ministers, satisfying MPs who might otherwise
desert the government, bringing about its downfall.
Australia is discussing an assistance program for CIS
(Harris 1991, 11), in addition to the RPNGC program
underway. It probably will propose a modest program to aid
the judiciary, under the Ministry of Justice. Australia has
also indicated its willingness to assist the National
Intelligence Organization (DFAT 1989a), an incipient
intelligence service that does not yet appear to have
assumed a significant role in the fight against crime. Of
all these institutions, so far only the RPNGC has received
major Australian aid to fight crime.
The RPNGC is confronted with an immense task in
attempting to enforce the laws of Papua New Guinea. Many
challenges appear beyond its potential to control; for
example, the Bougainville secessionist movement was
initially treated as a police problem, but rapidly escalated
beyond the RPNGC's ability to control (in part because of
the latter's own excesses and human rights abuses). RPNGC
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shortcomings are frequently blamed for escalating crime
capabilities, yet social change is also progressively
eroding informal controls. The nature of this change
suggests that the RPNGC is only part of the solution to
Papua New Guinea's crime problems--yet Australia is betting
heavily that national institutions such as the RPNGC and
PNGDF can solve Papua New Guinea's security problems.
Before detailing how Australia ended up so closely involved
with the RPNGC, it seems appropriate to review how and why
crime has come to be perceived as such a major problem in
Papua New Guinea.
I, The pisintegration of Law and Order in Papua New Guinea
The rise of "rascal gangs," comprised of increasingly
sophisticated criminals, during the past 25 years is the
principal justification for the general belief that law and
order is breaking down in Papua New Guinea. Prime Minister
Somare imposed a State of Emergency in the National Capital
District in June 1985, following a series of particularly
violent crimes committed by gang members. Dr. Bruce M.
Harris, currently with the Papua New Guinea Department of
Finance and Planning, described the gangs of Port Moresby
and their origins in detail in 1988 in a paper for the
Institute of Applied Social and Economic Research. He
concluded that they originally represented, in the 1960s and
1970s, a rational response, in some ways, to the lack of
opportunities young male migrants to urban areas faced. The
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gangs eventually became "vertically integrated criminal
networks with organised theft, protection, marketing and
distribution systems." (Hegarty 1989, 8). Harris today
believes that the original social and psychological needs
that gangs fulfilled for their members have been supplanted
by economic motives, with a parallel increasing willingness
to use brutality to achieve their goals (Harris 1991, 5).
"Rascals" do not discriminate: they prey upon both
expatriates and Papua New Guineans. Their lack of fear of
apprehension has emboldened them to the extent that many
highways in Papua New Guinea, for example, now are unsafe to
travel whether by day or night. Theft rings undertake
household and business break-ins on a massive scale, with
the goods sold through fronts run by gang members who would
otherwise have settled down and perhaps eschewed their
earlier gang membership. Major rascal gangs in fact have
carved out territorial domains in most urban areas and
consolidated their control by absorbing smaller gangs,
sometimes by acts of violent intimidation, such as gang rape
of women associated with rivals.
The law and order problem, however, cannot be blamed on
the rascals alone. Tony Siaguru, a lawyer and former Member
of Parliament (MP) , explains the stakes:
There is a disorder in our national scene that is
spreading rapidly and is cause for great concern for
13
responsible persons both inside and outside the
country. It is a disorder that is reflected in the
burgeoning law and order problem in our towns and our
Highlands; in the readiness of local people to take the
law into their own hands; in pressing for exaggerated
and selfish compensation claims against the national
interests of progress and development. It is reflected
in the excesses and riots of our very forces of the
maintenance of law and order; in the incompetency of
our system of practice of criminal prosecution and the
inability of our jails to hold hardened criminals.
It is especially reflected in the complete and utter
disregard of personal credibility by the great majority
of our politicians, national and provincial. And above
all, it is reflected in conversations with decent, once
proud Papua New Guineans, villager and townsman,
private sector employee and public servant, who feel
there is something wrong in the country, and
dangerously start talking of the extra-constitutional
ways in which the ills might be remedied (Hegarty and
Polomka 1989, 22).
The aspect of law and order of most immediate concern
is the threat to physical safety posed by criminal violence.
Australia's Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
sweepingly asserts "There is no doubt that PNG [Papua New
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Guinea] is a violent society." (DFAT 1989b, 9). DFAT's
most recent threat assessment put Port Moresby at the
highest level of threat of physical violence (Ibid, 24)
There is reason to be concerned. An Australian warrant
officer was recently killed, and a series of attacks on
foreign diplomats in Port Moresby has underlined the
vulnerability of expatriate residents.
The US Department of State, for its part, issued a
"Warning" on 16 March 1991, advising US citizen travelers of
a curfew, still in effect, to be imposed by 'the Papua New
Guinea government on the cities of Port Moresby, Lae,
Popondetta, Mt. Hagen, and along the Highlands Highway
between Goroka and Mt. Hagen. The Warning stated that
violent crime continues to be a serious problem in all areas
of Papua New Guinea, and noted that armed robberies and
sexual assaults upon women are increasing (USDOS 1991).
Some blame violent crime on Westernized young men,
outsiders to traditional culture and economic organization,
but without enough education to obtain employment or status
within the Westernized economy (Weisbrot 1985a, 171). DFAT
suggests that disillusionment with the government's failure
to deliver benefits expected encourages "raskolism" as an
alternative means of satisfying material needs (DFAT 1989a,
30). It pinpoints the ultimate cause, however, as the
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"breakdown of traditional values and cultural links with the
land." (Ibid, 54).
Crime and Melanesian Communities
Small-scale Papua New Guinean communities are distinct
social units occupying specific areas. They have well-
established mechanisms to regulate and punish unacceptable
behavior. There is much greater latitude to engage in anti-
social acts directed at other groups, but the tradition of
"payback," in which the offended party exacts revenge on the
group from which the hurt originates, is a powerful inter-
social restraint. Migration into urban areas considerably
weakens both intra- and inter-group sanctions, 1) because
fewer "wantoks" (fellow group members) are present, and 2)
because the anonymity of the town or city makes it more
difficult to identify and locate the offenders or their
relatives.
Confidence in the ability of the criminal justice
system to find and punish criminals to the satisfaction of
the victims is low, so many crimes go unreported, fueling
social tension. One of the largest protest marches in Papua
New Guinea history took place in October 1984 at government
offices near Port Moresby, calling for action to restore law
and order (Weisbrot 1985a, 170). A March 1989 demonstration
in Port Moresby expressing anger over the deaths of two
Papuans at the hands of Highlanders and demanding action on
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law and order problems turned violent, requiring both the
military and police to suppress it (Hegarty 1989, 10).
In rural areas, the 1984 Clifford Report, sponsored
jointly by business and government, found that inter-group
fighting is frequently perceived by participants not as a
wholesale violation of criminal law, but rather as a
solution to law and order problems they are unable to
resolve satisfactorily within the legal system (Clifford
Report, ii). The Clifford Report strongly emphasized that
community policing provides the most effective solution to
law and order problems (118-119). Its drafters admonished
the Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary not to undermine the
community's resources for dispute settlement. They declared
that the state is not the source of values contributing to
law and order in rural areas and affirmed that the village
courts are the best mechanism to support informal resources.
These findings parallel the opinions of T.E. Barnett,
who wrote on "Law and Justice Melanesian Style" over a
decade earlier. Barnett observed:
If an alien system is imposed which does not adequately
reflect basic Melanesian institutions it will result in
unnecessary stress and the law will be ignored in
important areas of daily activity. The courts will be
seen as incomprehensible institutions with no relevant
17
part to play in these matters (Ross and Langmore 1973,
59) .
Barnett declared that the Australian judicial system
has always been organized from the center and that it
reflected the wholesale importation of the Queensland
Criminal Code. He noted that this essentially alien legal
system was paralleled by "a flourishing alternative
unofficial court system," (Ibid, 61) presumably based upon
indigenous customs. Barnett foresaw impending problems as
indigenous social structures broke down, because "the
conflicts inherent in the existence of custom and cornmon law
side by side have not been resolved, and techniques for
their resolution have not been developed." (Ibid, 64). His
prescription was to integrate the system of village courts,
introduced prior to independence, with a law enforcement
system based on village officers, the latter having ceased
to exist with the abolition of village constables and
headmen.
Bernard Narokobi, Papua New Guinea's current Attorney
General and Minister for Justice, provided an illuminating
view from the Melanesian standpoint with his 1989 book, LQ
Bilong Yumi Yet ("Our Law NOw"). According to Narokobi:
Melanesian societies existed without an independent
idea of law or rule of law. Coercion or consequence
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flowing from human conduct were independent and
ancillary to the inevitability of human survival
without law. One need not reward good conduct and
punish an evil one through law courts to achieve an
ordered society. Not every conduct or misconduct in
Melanesia lends itself to inevitable reward or
punishment. It is difficult for modern states to
imagine human communities without any formal notion of
law or justice. To most modern minds, the equation of
'lawlessness' with anarchy conjures images of perpetual
war, violence, disorder and chaos (Narokobi 1989, 15).
This subversive formulation strikes at the heart of the
Western assumption that the rule of law--as defined in
Western terms--is the most desirable method of organizing
society. The recent raid on a mine operated by an
Australian company at Mt. Kare, in Enga province, vividly
illustrates the consequences of divergent communal and
Western norms. Enga Provincial MP Yalia led an armed gang
to the site, where the men tied up a processing plant crew
and advanced on the main camp with drawn guns, demanding
that the company build a road through the mountains to a
village (Pacific Islands Monthly, May 1991, 32).
By Western standards, this lawless, threatening
behavior by a Member of Parliament, entrusted with the
draftinq and approval of legislation, could only be
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condemned. But in the Melanesian context--regardless of the
MP's probable political motivation--Yalia was taking direct
and potentially effective action to further community goals.
The fact that the MP and his cohorts were acting against a
foreign organization expanded the range of acceptable
tactics beyond the limits generally accepted under the
Western rule of law.
Narokobi makes the point that Melanesian communities
based their actions upon their own traditions and norms,
rather than imported Western legal systems. Legitimacy
flowed from the group:
Each cultural unit was autonomous, possessed of its
origins, and defined as to its territorial boundaries
and legal postulates. Each was complete in itself, yet
interdependent with others in some respects, as are
nations today (Narokobi 1991, 20).
Narokobi blames the colonial administrators that ruled
Papua New Guinea for not recognizing Melanesian institutions
of social order, thereby "creating the seeds for social
disorder and the general 'breakdown in law and order'
experienced today in Papua New Guinea." (Narokobi 1991, 18).
Lawlessness ultimately stems from a host of factors,
some of them universal and some unique to Papua New Guinea.
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Criminals anywhere are encouraged when the risk of
apprehension is low, as it is in ?apua New Guinea. The
relative ease of escape from Papua New Guinean prisons
reinforces disrespect for formal criminal sanctions. Those
sanctions themselves all too frequently are not imposed
because police prosecutors are unable to prepare and argue a
case successfully in the Western-oriented judicial system,
imported virtually in toto from Australia.
These weaknesses in the formal law enforcement
machinery have coincided with a long-term decline in the
vitality and effectiveness of traditional, village and clan-
based, sanctions outside rural areas. Emigration of young
men to urban areas in search of wage employment has weakened
village social structures while simultaneously enabling a
lucky few to gain prestige, money and power through non-
traditional means, among them "rascalism." Village leaders
find it more difficult to exert authority when young family
members are supported by urban migrants, or look to
migration themselves as an option to escape participation in
the subsistence economy. Increased mobility carries social
costs of its own, however. Migration brings large numbers
of Papua New Guineans in contact with each other, but
outside the traditional, highly limited and circumscribed
bounds of rural life. This commingling in urban areas leads
to conflict unmediated by traditional settlement mechanisms.
The RPNGC has neither the resources, nor probably the
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inclination, to settle many such disputes, resulting in
willingness to violate Western-style law to obtain the
justice unavailable through the formal system. Urban crime
can therefore be viewed as a logical consequence of the
promiscuous mixing of peoples who have no traditional
obligations toward one another, in an arena in which
Western-style social controls are not yet in place, and may
never be as strong as the older, informal, Melanesian
mechanisms of social control.
Paradoxically, the decline in the formal justice
system's effectiveness has stimulated a revival of
traditional methods of settling disputes within rural areas.
The physical proximity of other groups traditionally
inculcated a rough "frontier" justice. If a malefactor was
seen heading in the direction of a given rival tribe, it was
assumed he belonged to that group, since he would not obtain
sanctuary from any other groups. The inability to identify
a particular criminal's responsibility did not deter the
offended party from asserting its rights to compensation
from, or to inflict punishment on, the other group as a
whole. Western-style concepts of fixing individual
responsibility and allowing a crime to go unpunished in the
absence of adequate proof as to who committed a crime simply
do not fulfill the social need to deter attacks upon one
group by another. These dynamics served as a powerful
restraint on group members tempted to attack members of
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other groups, since their own clansmen did not wish to fall
victim unnecessarily to "payback" attacks and frequent
compensation demands. The Australian kiaps also enforced a
relative peace between formerly warring groups, primarily
for their own purposes. The end of the kiap system left a
vacuum in measures of inter-group social control in rural
areas that is now being filled by a reversion to past
practice, particularly as aggressive individuals and groups
test the limits of how much they can obtain through extra-
legal means. The Bougainville rebellion, sparked by
dissatisfaction of landowners with the distribution of
compensation for damages caused by the gigantic copper-gold
mine at Panguna, exemplifies the decreasing social
constraints on the pursuit of self-interest when
rationalized as advancing group ends.
Namaliu Reaps the Whirlwind
Whatever the origins of crime, Prime Minister Namaliu
is held responsible, both domestically and internationally,
for taking steps to control it. On 14 March 1991, he
announced a curfew in Port Moresby and elsewhere. He
indicated his government would take a series of actions to
reduce lawlessness, apparently measures developed by the
Security Review Task Force chaired by William Dihm,
Secretary, Department of Personnel Management (Dihm 1991)
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-- Deploy the Defence Force, special constables and village
peace officers to help the police;
-- Provide the Police with extra vehicles, improved
communications and better facilities;
-- Construct gates on roads into Port Moresby to block
criminal movements;
-- Install emergency telephones in all police stations in
the National Capital District;
-- Recruit an additional 20 expatriate police to work in
police stations and on operations;
-- Build maximum security sections immediately at prisons
near Port Moresby and Lae;
-- Train prison officers in the use of firearms and provide
Defence Force and police support to keep prisons secure;
-- Ask Parliament to make the death penalty an option in
cases of murder and gang rape;
-- Introduce other forms of punishment such as tattooing
prisoners' foreheads;
-- Ensure that prisoners sentenced to life in prison serve a
life sentence;
-- Make available extra prosecutors and lawyers to speed up
hearings for serious crimes, and give police professional
assistance in preparing court cases;
-- Re-introduce the Vagrancy Act and a bill to allow
repatriation of unemployed people and trouble-makers to
their home areas;
-- Introduce an identity card or pass system, if affordable;
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-- Crack down on the sale of fire-arms and manufacture of
horne made guns;
-- Suspend all gun dealer licenses immediately and increase
penalties for illegal possession of firearms;
-- Restrict liquor sales during curfew periods and return
liquor licensing powers to the national government;
-- Draft laws to address problems associated with
extortionate compensation claims; and
-- Establish a National Guard to ensure that all youth
receive both military and civilian training (Namaliu 1991a)
The effectiveness of these measures, of course, depends
on their implementation. Former PM Somare's "49 measures,"
announced in October 1984 following the Clifford Report,
failed to have much impact for lack of follow-through.
Political conflict with the Opposition is likely to
sidetrack legislation needed to carry out some of Namaliu's
promises, such as implementing the death penalty.
Opposition Leader Wingti, responding recently to a Namaliu
statement on law and order at the opening of Parliament,
charged that crime is out of control, boding ill for non-
partisan cooperation (RANS, 7 May 1991). Four provincial
premiers announced their opposition to the National Guard
proposal in May (RANS 7 May 1991). Negative US reaction to
the tattooing proposal, reported by Papua New Guinea's
Ambassador in Washington (O'Neill 1991, 8), similarly could
prevent the adoption of that proposal. The tattooing
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proposal, guaranteed to tarnish Papua New Guinea's
international image, was nonetheless supported by PM
Namaliu, possibly because its drama instilled a sense in the
public that drastic measures would in fact be taken to stem
the tide of crime. Calls for such steps have not been
limited to politicians. The Director of the Institute of
National Affairs, John Millett, advanced the idea of turning
over convicted criminals to their victims for summary
execution in a paper presented at the February 1991 National
Summit on Crime (Millett 1991, 10). Millett also suggested
that the police were using an effective traditional remedy
by destroying the property of a clan harboring a suspect.
Unfortunately there appears to be little consensus
within Papua New Guinea on how to fight crime, or even on
what is crime. Given this lack of consensus, Namaliu will
have great difficulty accomplishing most of the goals he
set. This will place pressure on him to achieve at least
some visible results. The easiest method to deflect
political heat over crime is to focus on tangible
accomplishments that cannot be blocked by internal
opposition.
Namaliu asked in his speech that private businesses
assist police forces when approached, but local efforts are
likely to be small-scale, have limited impact, and fail to
impress politicians or voters interested in what can be done
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for their own districts. Foreign aid is a key potential
source for the funding to undertake large-scale, visible,
law and order projects that could be applied to as many
districts as possible for maximum political impact. The
government reportedly planned to approach donor countries
for law enforcement aid at the May 1991 annual consultative
group meeting (PACNEWS, 12 February 1991). No major
commitments directed at the police emerged from that
meeting, except for the Australians. Foreign aid donors
are unlikely to be interested in law enforcement projects
such as the construction of a maximum security prison
(advocated by some Papua New Guinea government officials)
Few governments wish to associate their assistance programs
with activities related to internal security.
Australia is the only major donor nation that is likely
to respond positively to Namaliu's efforts to secure a new
round of funding for improved police operations. Namaliu
requested additional police assistance from Australia during
an early 1991 meeting he had with a visiting Australian
parliamentary delegation (RANS, 3 March 1991). Australian
aid, however, is provided within a framework of bilateral
cooperation that resulted in a major expansion of police
assistance only last year. The RPNGC assistance program is
likely to corne under increasing pressure itself to produce
results, so the Australian government will scrutinize the
purpose and value of any additional requested aid intensely.
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Australia cannot afford the impression that its aid is
having little or no impact, any more than the Namaliu
government can afford the suggestion that it is unable to
cope with the law and order problem. Australia has
gradually become more and more deeply involved with the
RPNGC as part of an overall shift from budgetary support to
project aid. This transition is worth examining in detail
to understand the context in which Australia's assistance to
the RPNGC is provided.
II, Australia and the Royal Papua New Guinea Constabula~
Australian aid to Papua New Guinea is notable for the
high proportion of the total Australian aid budget it
represents, and the lack of conditions attached to it.
AIDAB asserts:
For many years, Papua New Guinea has been the largest
recipient of Australian aid. No other donor country
allocates as large a proportion of its total aid on an
unconditional basis to a single recipient: 61 per cent
in 1975/76, falling to 29 per cent in 1988/89.
Although Australian aid has declined in real terms over
the last decade, in 1988 it still represented over 70
per cent of PNG's total aid receipts and 17 per cent of
Papua New Guinea government resources (AIDAB 1989a, 3).
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Excluding defense cooperation, there are four components of
this assistance: budgetary support, project aid, balance of
payments support, and retirement payments to former
Australian government employees in Papua New Guinea.
Budgetary support refers to an annual subvention of A$
275 million in cash from fiscal years 1988/89 to 1992/93,
decreasing to A$ 260 million in fiscal year 1993/94, to the
Papua New Guinea government to be used as it sees fit. This
is the largest untied bilateral aid program in the world.
Project aid, linked to specific goals, will increase as
follows: A$ 15 million in 1988/89; A$ 20 million in 1989/90;
A$ 25 million in 1990/91 and 1991/92; A$ 30 million in
1992/93; culminating in A$ 35 million by 1993/94 (AIDAB
1989a, 11). An additional A$ 3.0 and 5.0 million will be
provided in fiscal years 1989/90 and 1990/91, respectively.
This A$ 8.0 million extra was pledged at a 1990 World Bank
Consultative Group Meeting for Papua New Guinea (AIDAB
1990d, 2),
Balance of payments support took the form of a once-only
1989/90 A$15 million cofinancing of a World Bank structural
adjustment loan (AIDAB 1990e, 22). These funds were also
pledged at the World Bank session noted above, making the
total additional Australian aid A$ 23.0 million.
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Australian government payments to retirees from the pre-
independence administration are likely, in contrast, to
continue indefinitely. The Papua New Guinea government is
not expected to assume responsibility for such payments to
Australians, given the relative poverty of the vast majority
of its own citizens. This line item amounted to A$ 16.4
million in fiscal year 1990/91 (AIDAB 1990d, 3).
Budgetary support underwrites much Papua New Guinea
government spending. Since it is cash, the Papua New Guinea
government does not have to contribute counterpart funding
nor shoulder other than essentially minor administrative
expenses. Nor are the funds tied to procurement in
Australia. Funding levels and guidelines for both budgetary
support and project aid were formalized in the May 1989
bilateral Development Cooperation Treaty, signed in Canberra
during Prime Minister Namaliu's first official visit to
Australia as Prime Minster.
A key Australian assumption--and indeed a Papua New
Guinean one as well--is that Australia will continue
providing both budgetary support and project aid well into
the future. From the Australian side, however, doubt has
increasingly been expressed about the effectiveness of
budgetary support in bringing about economic growth and
development, and thereby lessening the need for continued
Australian aid. One of the earlier such manifestations was
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the 1979 Harries Report, by the Committee on Australia's
Relations with the Third World. It recommended "a
significant switch from general budget support to project
aid." (Conroy 1980, 3).'
The 1984 Jackson Report, carried out under the auspices
of the then-Department of Foreign Affairs, warned
"Australian taxpayers may not continue to be supportive of
the large aid program in Papua New Guinea unless there is
evidence that the program is promoting social and economic
development." (Jackson Report, 164). AIDAB itself admitted
in its 1989 submission to an Australian parliamentary
committee investigating bilateral relations with Papua New
Guinea that one of its goals is "to maintain broad support
within the Australian community for assistance to PNG ... "
(AIDAB 1989a, 2). This seemingly self-serving objective
also reflects concern that the Australian taxpayer could
come to rebel at continued unrestricted budgetary support
for Papua New Guinea. Foreign Minister Evans did not
hesitate to invoke that specter during an April 1990 visit
to Papua New Guinea:
... 1 wouldn't wish anyone to think that ... resources
from Australia or anywhere else will flow open
endedly so long as problems like this continue. It is
very much a question of PNG itself showing the
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willingness, the enthusiasm and the commitment to
tackle its own problems (AIDAB 1990e, 1).
Australian policy-makers in the immediate post-
independence period assumed that budgetary support was
preferable to project aid because it enables the Papua New
Guinea government to make its own decisions and to implement
its own priorities. Retaining control over how Australian
funds were spent through designing and administering project
aid was perceived as a "neo-colonialist" approach to be
avoided at all costs. As the Jackson Report observed:
If the present system of budget support were to be
\ .
largely replaced by project aid tied to specific
activities in Papua New Guinea, major problems would
arise. Apart from the strains that would be
imposed on the Papua New Guinea budgetary system,
Australia would need to initiate large-scale
planning and implementation operations in Papua New
Guinea. There would be an undesirable tendency for
responsibility and decision making to be taken over by
Australian officials (Jackson Report, 162).
The Jackson Report nonetheless ended up endorsing a
gradual shift toward administering Australia's bilateral aid
to Papua New Guinea in the same manner as other regional
programs, i.e., through projects. The Parliamentary Joint
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Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence (JCFAD) accepted
these views, noting:
... the nature of the present program is not
satisfactory. It is a program that lacks balance: it
relies on a single mode of delivery and the recipient's
ability to use it effectively to achieve its
objectives; it does not necessarily allow and take
advantage of Australian skills and expertise to develop
aid activities in areas of Australian strength (JCFAD
1985, 21).
Foreign Minister Hayden visited Papua New Guinea in
late July 1985 to work out "new aid arrangements" including,
for the first time, project aid. The 1989 Development
Cooperation Treaty confirmed this shift toward project aid,
indicating Australia--and Papua New Guinea--formally
accepted the need to tailor assistance spending more
carefully to specific developmental goals. The two
governments' willingness to carry out this structural change
probably hinges, however, to a great extent on the
replacement of budgetary support by increasing income from
the mining and petroleum sectors, as major projects corne on-
stream in the mid-Nineties. If such projects are delayed,
or government income fails to materialize in the expected
amounts, Papua New Guinea may well have to corne back to the
bargaining table to seek additional budgetary support beyond
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that provided under the Treaty. The Bougainville crisis is
an object lesson in how unexpected events can alter the
best-laid economic and financial plans. Australia's
response will depend heavily on how Papua New Guinea is
perceived to have used--or abused--the aid it has previously
received.
Australian assistance to the RPNGC falls within the
scope of the Development Cooperation Treaty, itself
negotiated under the umbrella of the December 1987 Joint
Declaration of Principles (JDP). The JDP, a non-treaty
document, ensures that the bilateral relationship proceeds
on an even keel, without the disruption by such actions as
the sudden A$ 10 million cut in total Australian aid in
1986. The Joint Declaration is also a key element in the
Hawke administration's policy of "constructive commitment"
with the South Pacific, formulated by Minister Evans in
September 1988 (Evans 1989a, 10). The JDP formally commits
the two Governments to cooperate in law enforcement under
principle 18, "Legal Co-operation," of the 24 Basic
Principles. Principle 18 states:
The two Governments will co-operate, in accordance with
their international legal obligations and respective
laws, in the area of law enforcement and seek to
increase co-operation in other areas of the law,
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including taxation law, business law and family law[.]
(DFAT 1989a, Annex B) .
Principle 19, "Crime, Terrorism and Smuggling," can be
interpreted to support police assistance as well, insofar as
it mandates the two government to cooperate "to prevent,
detect and prosecute crime, terrorism and smuggling ... "
Principle 20, "Exchanges," encourages exchanges contributing
to the development of human resources, one of the police aid
project's principal objectives. The Joint Declaration
essentially blesses the RPNGC project, legitimizing it as an
appropriate recipient of bilateral aid, although the
Declaration does not commit Australia to take specific
actions. As one of the first aid projects undertaken under
the JDP and Development Cooperation Treaty, the RPNGC
program was also expected to acquire substantial symbolic
importance beyond its practical impact (Draper Report, 195)
Australia Lays the Foundation for a Police Aid Project
Australia, having conceived and directed the RPNGC in
the colonial period, naturally continued to play a major
role in it during the post-colonial period. As late as
1987, there were still 81 expatriate officers, for the most
part Australians, employed by the RPNGC at mid and upper
ranks (ADAB 1987, 25). Australian training programs
continued following independence, under the PNG-Australia
Technical Co-operation Program (PATCOP). Nineteen RPNGC
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Officers and Other Ranks were sent to Australia in 1984
through PATCOP, compared to only one to another country
(Millar Report, Appendices, 71). PATCOP's total budget,
however, amounted to only A$ 2.37 million in 1983/84, and
was projected to increase to A$ 2.97 million the following
fiscal year.
PATCOP covered a number of areas beside police training
but its funding made up less than one percent of total
Australian aid in each of those years (DFA 1984, 6). This
demonstrates the relatively low priority accorded to
specific programs aimed at the RPNGC. Materiel -assistance
and budgetary funding for the RPNGC, however, probably were
provided through the "Australian Grant-in-Aid" (A$ 299
million in 1984/85) and the "Miscellaneous Budget Items and
other Direct Expenditures in Papua New Guinea" (A$ 2.72
million in 1984/85) (Ibid) .
The 1984 Jackson Report had relatively little to say
about law and order in Papua New Guinea. It did comment
"Although not directly related to Australian aid policy, the
issues of law and order must be taken into account in any
consideration of the future of Papua New Guinea." (Jackson
Report, 158). This disclaimer of law and order as an
objective of Australian aid policy, however, could not
withstand the pressure building up for a major expansion of
Australian involvement with police functions in Papua New
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Guinea--pressure responded to with alacrity by the
Australian Government.
Prime Minister Michael Somare's June 1985 proclamation
of a national emergency in the National Capital District,
including Port Moresby, lent urgency to, if not actually
precipitated, a Papua New Guinean request for Australian
police aid (Hayden 1985, 1105). The emergency followed a
series of violent "raskol" gang attacks (Babbage 1987, 23)
It involved both a curfew and a shift of police officers
from other parts of the country to Port Moresby.
The emergency ended in early November, four days before
Australian Foreign Minister Hayden confirmed that Papua New
Guinea had requested police assistance and commented "There
is clearly scope for very useful co-operation between us
here." Hayden announced the dispatch of a senior Australian
police officer--E.T. Millar--to identify the requirements
for a five-year program; targeted July 1986 as the date for
commencement of the effort; and indicated the project was
intended to be part of "the new aid arrangements" he had
negotiated in late July (Hayden 1985, 1105).
The latter arrangements were intended to inaugurate
project aid as a component of the overall Australian aid
program. Police assistance must have appeared a highly
attractive proposal, given the importance of improved law
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and order to the economy, the support of the Papua New
Guinea government, and the value of retaining substantial
influence within a key security force during a period of
accelerated "localisation," in which Papua New Guinea
nationals were slated to replace many expatriates. At the
time, Hayden foresaw a place for project aid involving
corrective services (prisons) and the court system as well,
although no large-scale projects have yet materialized.
The Millar and Draper Reports
Hayden's expert, E.T. Millar, had the advantage of two
major recent reports in drafting his evaluation of how to
proceed with a police aid program: the Report of the
Committee to Review Policy and Administration on Crime. Law
and Order, commissioned by the Department of Provincial
Affairs (the December 1983 Morgan Report); and Law and Order
in Papua New Guinea (the 1984 Clifford Report). Yet Millar
seemed to draw few lessons from the latter, particularly its
emphasis on community policing.
Millar claimed at the outset that "this report is
submitted in the belief that the Constabulary wishes to move
from a mainly para-military style of policing to an
Australian style of policing which is more community based
and oriented ... " (Millar Report, 11). Only a few pages
later, however, he notes that "both the Chief Justice and
the Police Commissioner criticised the recommendation of the
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Clifford Report that village courts be made more
effective .... The Police Commissioner did not believe that
informal, community based agencies could provide a solution
to law and order problems ... " (Millar Report, 16). Millar
failed to address these divergent perceptions, apparently
assuming that the RPNGC looked to the Australian style as a
model to emulate. The idea that the RPNGC was dissatisfied
with its para-military structure and ideology was taken as a
given, rather than treated as an hypothesis that needed
further investigation.
There are several other important contradictions that
went unrecognized by either the author or his successors.
For example, Millar strongly recommended the expansion and
specialization of record-keeping despite the Clifforq Report
finding that existing records of such basic data as criminal
convictions were in a state of disarray (Clifford Report,
194). He also urged that police "be housed in the community
in the same way as other members of the community" but then
indicated he was thinking in terms of government-built
housing--by no means the same mode of housing enjoyed by
most community members (Millar Report, 18). Finally, Millar
recommended a substantial expansion of tertiary (university)
training opportunities for RPNGC constables (Ibid, 35)/
while simultaneously proclaiming that management training in
Australia for RPNGC members had not been successful due to
their lack of preparation (Ibid, 47).
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These contradictions foreshadowed problems that the
current RPNGC program still faces. The Australians, faced
with the multiple and manifold weaknesses of the police
system created under their own administration, assumed the
remedy lay in more of the same, i.e., improving the
implementation of their brand of policing. The Millar
Report, submitted to the Australian Development Assistance
Bureau (ADAB, later the Australian International Development
Assistance Bureau) in January 1986, nonetheless was used to
justify proceeding with an aid project that probably had
already been decided upon. Papua New Guinea Police
Commissioner Tasion announced the program publicly in
January 1987, well before the Australian government approved
it that August (PNGPC 1987) .
Laurie Draper, a retired Commissioner of the South
Australia Police, led a team to Papua New Guinea to
implement the next stage: drafting the Feasibility Study and
Project Design for an Aid Project to Assist the Royal Papua
New Guinea Constabulary (Draper Report). The Draper Report
displayed a keener appreciation of the difficulties inherent
in attempting to transfer Australian police management
styles and concepts. The team recognized that "The RPNGC is
part of a Western style system of law and order which has
been introduced into a culture which is very different from
western cultures." (Underlining in original). It also
observed that "community policing ... is a concept and a
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practice which has so far been scarcely attempted."
Report, 11).
(Draper
The Report's underlying assumption, however, remained
the same: RPNGC problems have their roots in failure to
follow proper (Western) management principles. For example,
after discovering a lack of supervisory skills at the Non-
Commissioned Officer and Officer levels, it blamed the
problem on failure to receive in-service training and the
irrelevance of the courses that were taken. The team
determined:
... superiors need:
More knowledge about management principles;
Better administrative and personnel skills;
To know how to discipline subordinates;
To understand how people work (Ibid, 53-54)
Given its unfamiliarity with "how people work" in Melanesian
societies, and consequent inability to formulate
recommendations based on Melanesian management styles, the
team probably had no alternative other than to fall back
upon suggestions as to how improve operations according to
the Australian paradigm. The perceived need, after all, was
to improve police operations within the existing structure,
not to come up with recommendations that deviated from
Australian models.
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The team therefore continued down the same path as the
Millar Report. It advocated improved supervisory training;
standardized police operating procedures and recording
systems (Ibid, 83); increased manpower (Ibid, 126); and a
high quality forensics unit (Ibid, 156) In an internal
contradiction of its own, the Draper Report supported
"community-based" policing (Ibid, 182), yet recommended
against funding up to 40 community police stations in favor
of only a few, high-profile, police stations in three
regional centers: Lae, Mt. Hagen and Madang (Ibid, 129-130)
The Draper Report came up with two Options for a five-
year training program--one costing A$ 20.165 million, and a
second, reduced, option, at A$ 11.871 million, covering
fiscal years 1987/88 through 1992/93. Both Options included
advisory services; fellowships for specialist training in
Australia (despite its firm opposition to a large-scale
fellowship program); equipment, such as highway patrol
vehicles, patrol boats, fax machines, communications,
computers, forensic supplies and training materials; and
administrative and management expenses (Ibid, 227-227a)
Conceptually, the proposed project was aimed at police
administration and operations; police training; forensic
science; and computer facilities (AIDAB 1988, 6).
The team endorsed Option One, with maximum expenditure,
maximum effort and, hopefully, maximum impact. Its four
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police officer members obviously were deeply convinced of
the need for a more professional RPNGC, clearly deficient
by their standards--in virtually all areas. Two officials
from Price Waterhouse Urwick, the company that became the
project's Managing Agent, were equally keen, if less
disinterested, participants (Draper Report, 5).
The RPNGC Project Takes Shape
The Draper Report was submitted to ADAB on November 15,
1986. ADAB, subordinate to the Department of Foreign
Affairs and Trade, prepared a May 1987 Appraisal Report
recommending that the project proceed at a total cost of A$
10.37 million, supporting the deployment of 14 advisors, as
well as other activities. An important factor in AIDAB's
August 1987 approval (AIDAB 1990d, 18) was the Appraisal's
assessment that "The Law and Order situation in PNG is bad
and, probably, it is getting progressively worse." (ADAB
1987, 6). The analyst also noted "Like most institution-
strengthening Projects there is a fair degree of risk that
the achievements will fall short of the objectives." (Ibid,
26). The benefits nonetheless outweighed the risks,
although assurances by Papua New Guinea regarding its
contributions were needed. (Ibid, 27).
Australia and Papua New Guinea signed a Memorandum of
Understanding establishing the police assistance project on
22 December 1987, only two weeks after the 7 December 1987
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signing of the Joint Declaration of Principles. Price
Waterhouse Urwick (PWU) was appointed Managing Agent that
same month. PWU began recruiting advisors--some from
countries other than Australia--almost immediately. They
had to take leaves of absence from their police positions to
become PWU employees (CT 1991). The first tranche was
assembled in Papua New Guinea in early 1988 in some haste,
probably due to DFAT dismay over the delay (considering
Minister Hayden's target date of July 1986) in getting the
project going. A three-month organizational review slated
to be conducted prior to the project was rescheduled to
begin simultaneously with implementation, due to "the AIDAB
requirement to establish the Project in-country as soon as
possible in 1988 ... " (AIDAB 1988, 5).
As of April 1988, the project was to cost A$ 11.9
million (Ibid, Summary). The project design was altered to
reflect an Option 3 (Ibid, 1) that reduced Australian
advisor inputs from 85 man-years in the original Option One
to 45 man-years. Option 3 also cut RPNGC national training,
administration and operations assistance, and forensic
science and computer facilities funding (Ibid, 6). Mr.
Draper was chosen Project Manager to direct in-country field
activity, a position he continues to hold as of mid-1991. A
Project Co-ordinating Group including officials of both
governments, as well as the Team Leader, was constituted to
provide policy guidance. The implementation document
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indicated that the training component, probably viewed by
the Australians as the most important element, was to
emphasize Papua New Guinea-specific content and
decentralization of training to the provinces (Ibid, 19)
Although not included in the RPNGC project itself,
Australia initiated two additional police assistance
activities in 1988. The Papua New Guinea government
requested 150 houses for RPNGC staff throughout the country
at a cost of A$ 6.6 million. In November 1988 it also
requested highway patrol vehicles, boats, fax machines and
additional electronic equipment valued at A$ 2.0 million.
The latter had been envisioned by the Draper Report and all
equipment was delivered by 1990 (AIDAB 1990d, 41-42).
Interestingly, the Australian government decided to
supply the housing despite the Draper Report's opinion that
RPNGC housing needs are a "domestic problem" undeserving of
Australian aid (Draper Report, 130). AIDAB expects to
provide prefabricated housing and prison fencing under the
Commodities Assistance Program (AIDAB 1989a, 55). The
latter assists developing nations to pay for Australian
goods (AIDAB 1989c, 2). The housing assistance pleases the
RPNGC beneficiaries, solidifying Australian ties; may be
viewed by Papua New Guineans as contributing, however
tangentially, to the fight against crime; and showcases
desperately-needed affordable housing, to the ultimate
benefit of its Australian manufacturers. The houses will be
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constructed in 1991-92, under an October 1990 MOU (AIDAB
1990d, 42).
In the past two years the RPNGC project has expanded,
in response to the deteriorating security situation in Papua
New Guinea, to a level well beyond the original Option One
recommended by the Draper Report. The project was
estimated to cost A$ 13.0 million in 1989 (AIDAB 1989c)
Project activities began in February 1988. In June 1989
additional advisors were authorized. By August 1990 there
were 21 long-term and four short-term advisors in Papua New
Guinea, based in Port Moresby, Lae, Rabaul and Mt. Hagen
(AIDAB 1990d, 18). The program was expanded again in
January 1990, following the Ministerial Forum (a bilateral
annual meeting established under the JDP). Support and
training for the Police Mobile squads was added (Anderson
1990, 6). The program then included seven components:
administration, operation, personnel management, forensic
science, computing, training and mobile squad training
(AIDAB 1990d, 19).
The Australian government nearly doubled both the size
and the cost of the project in the latter half of 1990. In
July 1990 it was estimated to cost A$ 14.766 million (AIDAB
1990e, Annex C7A). Prime Minister Hawke announced during a
September 1990 visit to Papua New Guinea that an additional
23 advisors would join the project at the host government's
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request, according to an Australian government briefing
paper (AIDAB Assistance 1991). The mid-1991 briefing paper
indicated the total estimated cost of the project through
its initial end date of December 1992 was A$ 29.0 million.
An informed source indicates that the total cost of the
project may now come closer to A$ 31.5 million.
The project is also consuming an increasing proportion
of the total Australian project aid budget, rising from 26
percent in fiscal year 1989/1990 (Anderson 1990, 6), to a
projected 45 percent of project aid during 1991 and 1992
(AIDAB Assistance 1991). This is the exact opposite of the
trend AIDAB had envisaged, i.e., an increasing emphasis on
health and economic infrastructure (AIDAB 1990b, 8). Police
assistance is beginning to crowd out other, perhaps equally
critical, development aid options dependent upon Australian
funds.
The briefing paper indicated that a comprehensive joint
mid-term review of the RPNGC project was undertaken in
October/November 1990 by the Tasmanian Police Commissioner,
Bill Horman. It stated that advances in all six components
(apparently excluding the Police Mobile units component
referred to above) of the project had been variable, but the
impact in the training component had been particularly
disappointing. The review recommended that training be
strengthened both centrally and at the regional level. It
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also highlighted inadequate Papua New Guinea resource
allocation to the police, to which the host government has
yet to respond. AIDAB declines to release the draft mid-
term review, perhaps because it may yet be modified after
the Papua New Guinea has completed its review.
Australia may be having second thoughts about the
extent to which the project will succeed. A 1989 AIDAB
publication admitted Papua New Guinea's law and order
problems pose formidable obstacles to Australia's
development cooperation program and declared " .. . it must be
recognized that Australia's capacity to assist with rural
development may be limited by social and political factors
beyond the scope of project aid." (AIDAB 1989a, 63).
It now appears likely that the project will be extended
when its formal term expires in December 1992, given the
potential negative impact on public confidence were the
increasingly visible program to end abruptly. Further
expansion cannot be ruled out, given that Prime Minister
Namaliu requested additional advisors during an early 1991
visit by 10 members of the JCFADT (RANS 3 March 1991), which
has been conducting a review of the bilateral relationship
since 1989. Paradoxically, Australia has greatly increased
its financial commitment and advisory presence on behalf of
the RPNGC at a time when the latter has corne under
increasingly sharp scrutiny for human rights abuses. The
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RPNGC human rights record deserves particularly close
scrutiny in light of its potential to evoke opposition
within Australia to expanded cooperation with the RPNGC.
III. Will Human Rights Limit Australian Police Aid?
Concern within Papua New Guinea over RPNGC lack of
discipline has been evident for a number of years. For
example, the 1984 Clifford Report, one of the most
comprehensive assessments of the law and order in Papua New
Guinea, noted that the police had an "emerging reputation
for discourtesies to the public, for arrogance, for violence
and for unseemly, often criminal public behaviour."
(Clifford Report, 214). It took the repressive PNG reaction
to the ongoing rebellion on Bougainville island, however, to
focus the attention of such worldwide human rights
monitoring groups as Amnesty International (AI).
In January 1990, AI released detailed descriptions of
the alleged torture, ill-treatment and consequent deaths of
two Bougainvilleans, one by the PNG Defense Force (PNGDF)
and the other by both the PNGDF and the police. In the
latter case, Aloysius Minitong, a farmer and environmental
critic of the Panguna copper mine, was arrested on suspicion
of being a member of the secessionist Bougainville
Revolutionary Army. He was held without charge and beaten
at the Boku police station, transferred to an army camp at
Panguna and beaten again, and then taken to Joint Forces
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headquarters in Arawa, where he was further beaten. He was
then jailed at the Arawa police station without medical
attention for his injuries, where he died on 28 December
1989 (AI 1990b).
AI followed up on the situation in Bougainville with a
scathing report issued 26 November 1990 condemning the PNG
Defense Force and riot police (RPNGC Police Mobile units)
for having killed and tortured scores of people there during
the preceding two years. It reported that "The government
took few steps to stop or investigate these violations
some ministers and public officials virtually condoned
them .... We fear security forces could kill and torture again
if they are redeployed on Bougainville and are once again
allowed to take the law into their own hands." (AI 1990a)
AI conceded that the BRA had itself committed acts of
violence, including murder (AI 1990b, 3). In fact, it
ambushed and killed three policemen in early December 1988
(Maclellan 1989, 52). AI nonetheless noted that it believes
"the use of violence by armed opposition groups can never be
used to justify violations of basic human rights by
governments." (AI 1990b, 3).
Australia's Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
(DFAT) flagged its own uneasiness over police conduct on
Bougainville in an August 1989 submission to the
Parliamentary Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence
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and Trade. DFAT declared "The early undisciplined behaviour
of the security forces, notably the police, gave rise to
considerable concern that their activities could further
alienate local people, many of whom may have some sympathy
for the secessionist cause." (DFAT 1989a, 35).
The allegations of police brutality by no means have
been limited to Bougainville. Over 450 police reportedly
were deployed in Operation "Lo-Met '88" in September 1988 to
Bougainville, the coastal provinces of Madang and Morobe,
and several Highlands provinces. A PNG Parliamentary Member
for Kainantu, in the Highlands, charged the following
November that two of his constituents had been killed during
the operation. An Eastern Highlands province MP, Andrew
Korarome, was badly beaten by police and military personnel.
Other reports claim that 14 villages in the Southern
Highlands province were burned down, affecting 3000 people
(Maclellan 1989, 38).
The US Department of State assesses the state of human
rights in Papua New Guinea, as it does for virtually all
nations worldwide, annually in its respected series, Country
Reports on Human Rights Practices. Its February 1991 report
indicated "police abuses appear to be growing" in Papua New
Guinea (US Congress 1991, 990). Regarding Bougainville, it
noted that the head of the national police had warned his
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force that human rights violators would be punished (Ibid,
991), but then added:
Police, in Bougainville and elsewhere, were accused
of beatings and rape. A staff assistant to a Member of
Parliament was beaten by police, taken to a police
station, and beaten again after accidentally bumping
into a policeman while leaving a shop in Port Moresby,
despite his prompt apology. The policeman was later
charged. In another incident, a woman was pursued by
men in an unmarked van. When she appealed to police in
a patrol car, she was abused and severely beaten by
policemen who emerged from the van. In East Sepik
Province and Lae, policemen were formally charged with
rape. There are credible reports that, in responding
to the virtually constant tribal warfare of the
highlands, mobile police squads have engaged in
instances of rapes, beatings, slaughter of livestock,
and burning of houses. (US Congress 1991, 992).
Within Papua New Guinea, the government Ombudsman,
Charles Maino, deplored "Police bashing" of detainees, which
he asserted goes on "almost daily." Maino declared during
the February 1991 National Summit on Crime that "Police
bashings and mistreatment of arrested persons must be
stopped." (Maino 1991, 8). Echoing a conclusion reached
earlier in the Clifford Report (p. 197), Chamber of Commerce
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and Industries President Stan Joyce claimed that many
penalties for crime are so light the police "would rather
break a few bones on the way to the police station" since
they know whatever sentence the criminal receives would not
deter him from committing the crime again (Joyce 1991, 18).
Police Commissioner Ila Geno himself acknowledged at
the same meeting that the Mobile Force's inadequacies were
highlighted clearly by its experience in the NSP (North
Solomons Province, including Bougainville island). Geno
declared that a mass re-training exercise was consequently
undertaken for the Mobile Force. He admitted:
"Too many complaints of misconduct and even brutality,
was [sic] tarnishing the image of the Force. To combat
this, I used two prongs. On one hand, I insisted on
prompt investigation and harsh, deterrent punishment in
cases of misconduct. This has gone a long way in
restoring public faith in the Police. At the same
time, I have upgraded the Community Relations
Directorate, and have placed emphasis on the aspect of
community policing. It is my endeavour to promote
better and closer relations between the Police and
Public (Geno 1991, 20).
On 4 February 1991, just before the National Crime
Summit, Police Minister Ijape directed Geno to begin
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disciplining his constables and commissioned officers, in
response to "numerous complaints from all sectors of the
community on the behaviour of pOlicemen." (PACNEWS).
Origin and Public Perceptions of the RPNGC
It seems clear that virtually all sides accept that
extensive human rights violations by RPNGC elements have
occurred. To understand how this propensity to abuse carne
about, and why it is not likely to end soon, it is necessary
to appreciate the origin and public perceptions of the
police in Papua New Guinea. In 1890 British authorities in
southeastern New Guinea island, then known as "British New
Guinea," and later called "Papua," raised the first Armed
Native Constabulary. The Germans in their own colony of New
Guinea to the north and east first employed "police
soldiers" in 1896, including Malays and men from Buka, a
small island just north of Bougainville (Kituai 1988, 156)
Papua carne under Australian administration in 1906, and New
Guinea followed with the 1914 outbreak of World War I.
Kituai, in article on villagers and police in Papua New
Guinea, argues convincingly that the early police forces
were organized along para-military lines. Their purpose was
not to enhance the security of the hundreds of separate and
often warring indigenous tribes, but rather to bring these
peoples under colonial control. The Australian
administration was pre-occupied with the latter as late as
the 1960s, so it is not surprising that extension of
government authority was regarded as the paramount goal
throughout virtually its entire colonial period. The
obligations imposed on Australia under the UN Trusteeship it
assumed over New Guinea following World War II almost
certainly took a back seat to this overriding objective.
Pacification was regarded as successful when government
patrols, spearheaded by a European patrol officer (kiap) and
indigenous policemen, were able to operate in an area
without challenge. Those forces levied work requirements,
suppressed inter-tribal fighting, collected taxes and census
figures, inspected labor recruitment, and occasionally
procured indigenous women, all by force if necessary. The
very act of establishing government posts on clan-owned land
was viewed as a hostile act when no compensation was paid.
Kituai claims that the patrols were willing to use
force because 1) the administration supported efforts to put
down repugnant traditional customs, such as infanticide,
tribal fighting, polygamy, cannibalism and headhunting; and
2) indigenous policemen accepted the theory that it was
"necessary to use force to keep belligerent individuals and
tribes under control." He concludes that the kiap and
colonial system "in general required the police to be tough,
dictatorial and sometimes brutal." (Kituai 1988, 158).
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Policemen were normally recruited from one area to be
used in another, since few would willingly injure fellow
clan-members, with whom they identified themselves, on
behalf of an alien group. This policy continues today: one
observer notes that constables are not normally posted to
their home areas, while another declares that most police
are not posted even to their home province (Millar Report,
23; and Draper Report, 13). Constables are frequently
rotated out of an area before they have acquired the
experience needed for proficiency (Clifford Report, 195),
further decreasing the likelihood of establishing ties with
local communities.
At best, pacified peoples regarded the colonial
government as a foreign intruder dedicated to interference
with indigenous customs and culture. For most of the
colonial period, the policing function in rural areas was
carried out by the kiap, supported by his men, whereas the
Constabulary as an institution was largely confined to the
larger towns and cities and their environs (Draper Report,
12). The RPNGC incorporated the remnants of the kiap system
following independence into the Field Constabulary, as
distinguished from the Regular and Reserve Constabularies
(Draper Report, 21-22). It thereby became heir to a long
tradition of strong-arm rule over fractious peoples.
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Steven Zuckerman, analyzing the case of a Highlander
wrongfully killed by policemen near Port Moresby in 1979,
makes the important point that indigenous peoples themselves
may ultimately have corne to see the police as a separate
"lain," or clan, in and of itself (Scaglion 1981, 49).
Zuckerman noted that whether the accused were "on duty" or
"off duty" did not exculpate the government from having to
pay compensation in the eyes of the bereaved group because
of its interpretation of the police as a separate clan. The
uniforms, ceremonies, and common housing all reinforce the
tendency of indigenes to perceive an unfamiliar group of
aliens as a homogenous unit similar to their own.
RPNGC Structure and Attitudes
The post-independence structure of the RPNGC has
perpetuated the public perception of it as an alien
institution. The Papua New Guinea police are under the sole
control of the national government. Neither the local nor
Provincial governments--nor indigenous tribes, for that
matter--control any police units. RPNGC Provincial
Commanders do not answer directly to anyone within the
provinces they serve, unlike the highly decentralized
American police, or even the provincially organized
Australian police. For example, an RPNGC provincial
commander job description emphasizes "A Provincial Police
Commander is autonomous within his province and not
responsible [boldface in original] to any person outside of
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the Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary in the exercise of
his primary functions." (Draper Report, Appendix 3.5, 5).
Similarly, a police station is "a fully autonomous unit,"
commanded by a Commissioned Officer or NCO "who is
responsible directly to the Provincial Police Commander."
(Draper Report, 25).
The RPNGC today is still considered to retain a self-
image as a "Force," rather than as a "Service." For
example, a recruit graduating from the RPNGC Bomana Training
College was said not to know whether he was in the police or
in the defense force (Millar Report, 44). The Clifford
Report confirms:
A para-military approach dominated the structure,
thinking, training and practices of the police force
prior to independence. None of the efforts made before
independence or since have been able to shake this
dominant characteristic.
It notes in the same breath that "There is a very limited
role for para-military policing in Papua New Guinea." The
Report concludes "The persistent military nature of the
police is, in part, responsible for the present deficiencies
in the police force .... until the police become a community
based police force they will continue to be progressively
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less capable of adequately handling crime in Papua New
Guinea." (Clifford Report, 206).
The expectation that the police would remain in the
hands of the national government informed even the
recommendations of the Constitutional Planning Commission,
well-known for its bias toward decentralization, as it drew
up Papua New Guinea's Constitution prior to independence in
1975. The CPC promoted the establishment of provincial
governments, advocating that governmental functions be
shared according to a three-part division: powers reserved
to the national government (the A list); subjects on which
the provincial governments could legislate if the national
government had not done so (the B list); and powers to be
vested exclusively in the provinces (the C list) .
The CPC reserved the police power for the A list, along
with foreign affairs, defence, fiscal and monetary policy,
national planning and other key functions. It may have
recognized that any effort to decentralize policing at that
time would jeopardize the very introduction of provincial
government. The ~atter was achieved only by dint of a 1977
Organic Act following vigorous and frequently bitter demands
by residents of Bougainville and other restless provinces.
The Organic Act embodied substantially the same division of
authorities as drawn up by the CPC, in particular confirming
59
national government authority over the police (Bonney 1986,
21-24) .
There is no discernible movement today to devolve
police functions to subnational entities, although there is
an official, largely rhetorical, commitment to instituting
"community-based policing." Papua New Guineans themselves
appear to have accepted the colonial assumption that the
police power is best exercised on behalf of a centralized
administration through a national entity.
The Australian Dilemma
A Papua New Guinean national police that frequently
abuses its authority poses a potentially serious policy
dilemma for Australia, committed as it is to the rule of law
and democracy, to the extent they are attainable, in its
strategically important neighbor to the north. Vigorous
Australian efforts to champion human rights aroused
resentment among Third World nations, reportedly costing
Australia re-election to the UN Human Rights Commission in
the late 1980s (McMichael 1987, 322). Such efforts have
been conspicuous by their absence, for the most part, in
relation to Papua New Guinea. The principal exception, of
course, has been Australian expressions of concern over
human rights violations during the Bougainville crisis.
60
Prime Minister Hawke's Labor government so far has
steered a middle course between two opposing tendencies in
Australian politics: the assumption by the Right that
assistance to Papua New Guinea is strategically justified,
regardless of its government's behavior; and the suspicion
of the Left that assistance to Papua New Guinea, although
intrinsically and perhaps morally justified, is provided
only to protect Australian economic and security interests.
The Hon. Andrew Peacock, MP, former leader of the
Opposition in the mid-Seventies, and former Opposition
shadow Foreign Minister, foresaw the usefulness of events in
Papua New Guinea as a domestic issue. He scored the then-
Labor Government during Papua New Guinea's transition to
independence for alleged unwillingness to assist Papua New
Guinea in the event of a major breakdown of law and order,
pledging that the Opposition would not take such an approach
(Wolfers 1976, 253). Peacock observed in 1986 that in most
cases Australia would be unable to compel any change in
foreign human rights practices, with its efforts achieving
little at considerable cost (News Weekly 1986, 9).
MP John Spender, the Opposition's shadow Foreign
Minister in 1988, had another go at a Labor Government by
claiming, in reference to Australia's Fiji coup measures:
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The Opposition believes in aid, not sanctions.
Sanctions only hurt the people. When sanctions are
imposed, or aid is cut off, a needy country is forced
to reroute its energies. Necessity becomes the mother
of invention and, to survive, the disaffected looks
elsewhere for assistance." (Writer 1988, 14-15).
Shadow Minister for Foreign Affairs Robert Hill indicated
last year that the Opposition views the law and order crisis
as "a time of testing" for the Papua New Guinea government,
during which Australia must "stand prepared to continue to
offer reasonable assistance and political support."
(Anderson 1990, 13).
In the same skeptical vein, an Australian academic
observes that human rights advocacy imposes certain costs:
1) it leads to an over-emphasis on the role and functions of
international organizations such as the United Nations; 2)
it is "an encouragement to a kind of ethno-centric or
cultural imperialism," imposing Australian values on other,
very different, societies; and 3) it undermines Australia's
claim to be sovereign over its own affairs (Gelber 1989) .
The net effect of these views is to downplay the importance
of human rights abuses in Papua New Guinea.
The Australian Left's attitude toward assistance to
Papua New Guinea displays its own unique bias, centering on
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the proposition that "Budget support [cash transfers to the
PNG government] is the highest quality aid because it is
entirely under the control of the PNG Government: there is
no element of neo-colonialism in its administration."
(Langmore 1988, 25). This preference for giving cash, as
opposed to project aid, to Papua New Guinea satisfies a
perceived need to make up for the harm caused by Australian
colonialism. It begs the question of what is done with the
funds.
Maclellan, writing in the liberal church journal Arena,
does examine the motivations for Australian aid to the
RPNGC. He concludes that use of the police to control trade
unions and landowners "have raised the perception that
increased funds for policing are geared to creating a
suitable climate for investment in major economic projects."
(Maclellan 1989, 37). A delegation organized by the H.V.
Evatt Memorial Foundation similarly asserts "The root of
human rights problems in Melanesia lies in the policies of
forced development along western industrial lines." (Scott-
Murphy 1987, 37). Such analysis leads them to decry the use
of police to impose land use decisions and industrial
settlements upon disgruntled landowners and workers,
respectively. This opposition, however, is only a minor
discordant element in a larger consensus supporting, or at
least not objecting to, Australian police assistance.
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Since the issue of how best to support law and order is
an uncomfortable topic, there is a strong temptation to
ignore it. Australian MP John Langmore, in a lengthy
analysis of the Papua New Guinean and Australian economies
in the global context, fails even to hint that problems with
law and order are setting back Papua New Guinean efforts to
achieve sustainable development (Langmore 1988). Similarly,
the Law Association for Asia and the Pacific omits any
mention of crime or law and order in its proposed Pacific
Charter of Human Rights, preferring instead a vague
exhortation in Article 27 that "Individuals shall exercise
their rights and freedoms with due regard to the rights of
others, collective security, morality and common interest."
(Lawasia 1988, 48). Joseph Camilleri, a political scientist
at La Trobe University in Australia, goes a step further by
failing to address Papua New Guinea in his otherwise
comprehensive survey of Australian human rights policy
toward foreign countries (Camilleri 1989).
Left-wing and human rights activists QQ appear
fundamentally skeptical of, if not opposed to, to assistance
to "security forces." For example, a Socialist Party of
Australia publication claims:
Australian civilian and foreign aid programs ... need
redirecting. At the moment they reinforce political,
military and economic dependency of smaller nations on
Australia and other Western powers (Booker 1987, 24).
Camilleri declares that, in response to "lurid scenarios of
foreign intrusion," Australia decided to expand its military
role in the South Pacific, specifically by providing
"training and technical support for [island state] defence
and security forces," among other activities. He believes
"The resulting militarisation of these small and fragile
communities was likely to deepen their external dependency
and strengthen the coercive apparatus of the state, thereby
weakening the social and political fabric necessary for the
observance of human rights." (Camilleri 1989, 112).
By implication Camilleri.casts doubt on the idea that
supporting foreign police in hopes of containing crime will
improve the human rights of the populace at large, but he
fails to develop this argument with respect to Papua New
Guinea. To come out against police aid to Papua New Guinea
directly, of course, would have invited critics to shift the
argument to strategic issues. The operative consensus that
so far has precluded significant human rights criticism of
Australia's police aid program has been expressed best by
David Anderson:
Law and order has clearly become a serious problem. As
their performance in Bougainville demonstrated, there
65
is a pressing need for greater discipline and better
training for both the PNG Defence Force and the police.
This is one area in which Australia can help, is
helping and should help more. The challenges to law
and order spring of course from deeper economic and
social causes and can only be dealt with successfuly
[sic] by long-term economic and social policies. But a
more efficient, better motivated and better disciplined
police force is essential in what most observers
consider a deteriorating security situation (Anderson
1990, 2).
Australian Government Policy
Camilleri is not the only scholar to have given
Australian policy-makers a free ride during the last several
years on the issue of assistance to Papua New Guinea. For
example, John Connell, a University of Sydney lecturer,
finds that lack of police discipline encourages excessive
use of force, but still concludes that "human rights have
not been infringed" in Papua New Guinea (Connell 1989, 18
and 23). The Australian government's budgetary support aid
policy won the backing of both the Opposition and its
critics from the Left, although for markedly different
reasons. The government has thereby been able to avoid
addressing the question of human rights abuses perpetrated
by the RPNGC. Neither former Foreign Minister Bill Hayden
nor current Foreign Minister Gareth Evans mentioned
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conditions in Papua New Guinea in their principal official
human rights speeches (see bibliography). Nor did Hayden's
first statement on the incipient RPNGC aid program (Hayden
1985) acknowledge that police behavior itself sometimes
posed a problem.
In a United Nations forum in 1986, Australia took the
position:
Assistance which promotes the development of national
human rights infrastructures can take a variety of
forms and should be accorded greater priority in
deliberations. It has also to be recognised that many
human rights violations occur as a result of
carelessness in discipline or poor training. Improved
training of public officials, especially those
responsible for law enforcement and custodial
institutions, is therefore of crucial importance
(Robertson 1986, 164).
Senator Evans himself indicated in 1989 that "our primary
objective in both aid policy and human-rights policy is to
improve the situation on the ground for the ordinary
citizen." (Evans 1989b, 196).
These justifications for Australian police aid stood
the test of time reasonably well, at least until
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international attention focussed on the RPNGC role in
Bougainville atrocities. It was in the context of
Bougainville that the Australian Department of Foreign
Affairs and Trade (DFAT) publicly aired misgivings about
police behavior, in an August 1989 submission on relations
with Papua New Guinea to the Parliamentary Joint Committee
on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade (JCFADT) (DFAT 1989a,
35). The JCFADT apparently failed to question DFAT further
on the issue (AIDAB 1990a). Indeed, it had already
commended the government for instituting the police
assistance project in a March 1989 report, Australia's
Relations with the South Pacific (JCFADT 1989, 205). This
parliamentary absolution, combined with the lack of
substantive human rights criticism by domestic Australian
non-government organizations or other pplitical groups,
gives the Australian government virtually a free hand to
implement police assistance programs for Papua New Guinea.
Virtually the same condition with respect to military
assistance was recently acknowledged publicly in the
reported decision by the Australian government not to place
conditions on the use of military equipment provided to the
PNGDF--an issue that first arose as a bilateral irritant
when Australia expressed concern over the PNGDF's alleged
use of Australian-provided helicopters to conduct operations
against the BRA with concomitant civilian casualties.
68
There are signs, however, that Australia is beginning
to suggest that the RPNGC assign higher priority to
discipline. The Police Mobile Unit retraining previously
noted by Commissioner Geno undoubtedly involved introducing
an appreciation of the value of restraint, even when dealing
with sullen, perhaps hostile, civilians. The Australians
appear ready to emphasize ethics, humanitarian values and
community-based policing, as well as the importance of
community support, in their advisory operations. The
problem is that such goals tend to become merely trees in a
forest of priorities. Only sustained and determined support
by high-ranking RPNGC officials, backed up by the commitment
of the civilian leadership, stands any chance of changing
current RPNGC attitudes toward human rights. The RPNGC
leadership in the immediate past has shown itself less than
committed to the rule of law and discipline. Former Police
Commissioner Tohian was arrested and charged with treason
after issuing a 14 March 1991 call for police officers to
assemble at Parliament to overthrow the government (Wesley-
Smith 1991, 194). This poor example symbolizes the struggle
within the police leadership over the proper role of the
RPNGC in a society riven by ethnic and political conflict.
Iy. strategies for the Future
There are a number of strategies Papua New Guinea can
undertake to deal with its recurring crime problems. It is
probable that no one single one of the following potential
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strategies will predominate, due to conflicting interests
among key decision-makers. The importance of implementing
at least some program, syncretic or not, is already driving
the Government and is likely to filter down to individual
MPs as well over time. Whether this will result in an
effective effort remains to be seen.
Re-Allocation of Domestic Resources
PM Namaliu announced in an opening address at the
February 1991 National Crime Summit that for the first time
in years, the national budget contains a real increase in
spending on the police and correctional institutional
services (Namaliu 1991b). At the same seminar "the 1990
razor gang's decision to abolish the Ministerial Committee
on Law and Order" was noted (Millett 1991, 18), sending a
mixed signal about administration priorities. Only last
November, the media was reporting "Police facing money
worries" (PNGPC 1990) with regard to the 1991 police budget.
The Papua New Guinea government tends to have
difficulty ensuring consistent and adequate funding for law
and order. AIDAB notes that the previous Wingti
administration's policy of emphasizing the "productive" over
the "social" sector had very apparent social costs due to
cutbacks in law and order spending (AIDAB 1990e, 13). For
example, Wingti's 1986 RPNGC budget was Kina 41.295 million,
but it had to be increased to avoid dismissing 300 members
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of the Constabulary. The projected 1987 budget was K39.7
million (Draper Report, 174), although it later ended up at
K41.081 million (ADAB 1987, 3).
Taking a longer-term view, Law and Order as a sectoral
component of government expenditure (including Correctional
Services, Defence, Justice, Magisterial Services, the
National Court, and the Police) decreased from 11.6 percent
in 1981 to 10.5 percent in 1989 (AIDAB 1990c, 19). It was
scheduled to decline further to 10 percent in 1990, despite
government statements that 'it was to receive priority (Ibid,
20). The projected sectoral allocation for Law and Order in
the Public Investment Programme (Papua New Guinea's plan for
capital investment in government projects) as of March 1990
shows a steady annual decrease, from K15 million in 1989 to
K9 million in 1993 (Ibid, 38). There is room to wonder
whether Papua New Guinea is willing to pony up the extra
funds it deems necessary for the sector. The Australians
must suspect Papua New Guinea would like to hold the line on
Law and Order spending by obtaining increased foreign (i.e.,
Australian) support.
Expanded Australian Assistance
This option, of course, is a very popular option in
Papua New Guinea, but not as popular in Australia. PM
Namaliu's call last March for even more police assistance
reflects the assumption that more is better. There is
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reason to believe the Australians would respond positively
to requests for incremental police assistance for
specialized purposes, but the odds they will double the
program size yet again are slim. To do so would invite
criticism that they are militarizing a project aid program
originally intended to achieve a balance in meeting Papua
New Guinea's pressing social and economic development needs.
Dr. Bruce Harris, the author of the respected study of
rascal gangs referred to earlier and currently attached to
the Papua New Guinea Department of Finance and Planning,
recently argued that RPNGC training is wasted because the
beneficiaries are constantly seeking transfers to posts with
better housing. He claims that provision of accommodation
should be a first priority:
Rather than spending ten or twenty million over the
next few years in unsustainable training, let us
develop the basic condition which will ensure that such
training can be sustainable -- that is, through
improvement in accommodation and terms and conditions
of service we can stabilise the force and improve
morale. At that time we will be ready to embark on a
comprehensive training programme which will have
lasting effects (Harris 1991) .
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Harris advocates providing enough houses and barracks so
that every member of the uniformed forces--police, defense
force and correctional services--has a place to live. He
notes that the Papua New Guinea government is currently
discussing implementing a program with Correctional Services
similar to that now underway for the RPNGC and remarks "we
will insist that accommodation and terms and conditions be
the centrepiece of any such programme."
The cost of providing housing up to Australian
standards for any significant proportion of the uniformed
services is obviously far beyond the resources of either
Papua New Guinea or Australia, so it is simply not on. The
proposal nonetheless is valuable for the insight it provides
into an important assumption underlying the housing issue:
the belief that the police cannot fulfill their assigned
duties unless they are housed separately from the
communities in which they are stationed.
Community-based Policing
This strategy would de-emphasize financial resource
increases in favor of a change in RPNGC style, to one less
confrontational and more service-oriented. It would focus
on developing community relationships so as to gain the
information necessary to combat criminal activities without
coercion or intimidation. Community-based policing does not
consist solely of the various programs mounted in its name,
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such. as Neighborhood Watch, safety houses, and foot patrols.
Nor is it synonymous with enlisting the private sector to
fund police projects the RPNGC cannot afford. Rather, it
comprises "an approach to policing that recognizes that the
police serve the public and that effectiveness depends on
the public's cooperation and help."
The prospects for a successful RPNGC transition to
community-based policing without radical change in its self-
image as a para-military force are limited, despite
professions of commitment from high-level RPNGC officials.
The recent order by a Provincial Police Commander
authorizing his men to shoot anyone destroying property in
Goroka, Eastern Highlands province (RANS 6 June 1991), is an
example of the para-military ideology in action. Proposals
to continue or even accelerate the separation of police from
the community through aid-financed housing would work
against, rather than for, this goal, but this nonetheless
appears to be the direction the government is favoring.
The Papua New Guinea government may well propose that
its Papua New Guinea Defence Force (PNGDF) soldiers be
retrained and equipped with Australian assistance to serve
police functions. A "joint" but "separate" military
cooperation review requested by PM Namaliu last September
during PM Hawke's visit (TPNG 1990) is currently underway.
It provides an avenue for discussing how to allocate
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increased Australian military assistance, which has doubled
to A$ 54 million in 1990/1991 since the Bougainville crisis
began (AIDAB 1990e, 23). One alternative is to redirect
part of the military budget to internal security functions,
i.e., to the RPNGC instead of the PNGDF. The second, more
likely, alternative (assuming the PNGDF would object to a
substantial cut in its resources), would be to assign police
functions to PNGDF units. Given that the behavior of the
PNGDF on Bougainville was no better than that of the RPNGC,
and may have been worse, there seems to be little
justification, at least in terms of winning over
communities, for its involvement in police activities,
although it might prove useful in securing major highways
currently threatened by criminals. Militarizing police work
would ultimately drag the RPNGC further toward the military
outlook, rendering the RPNGC less likely to adopt community
service concepts suggested by Australian advisors.
Devolution of Police Functions
Devolution is the principal option that has almost
never been seriously considered. The top police brass would
be unalterably opposed, of course, to any establishment of
competing centers of authority, particularly in light of the
difficulty they have as it is in gaining RPNGC funding.
Devolution, to stand the greatest chance of succeeding,
would have to take place below the provincial level, at the
levels of effective community mobilization. This means the
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villages. Following T. E. Barnett's emphasis on the
importance of community self-policing (Ross and Langmore
1973, 67), the existing village peace officers could be
upgraded to independent "town constables," recognized as
having the power to enforce village court decisions, and
provided a monthly stipend. Training for those communities
ready to sponsor their officers could be provided by RPNGC
elements in Melanesian Pidgin, using community-based
curricula and concepts provided through the Australian RPNGC
project. The Village Court system itself is viewed as an
effective institution. For example, Australia devotes a
great deal of effort to defining its jurisdiction over
Australian military personnel in the Status of Forces
agreement negotiated with Papua New Guinea (ADOD 1989, Annex
A) •
This concept is not a popular one in either Australian
or Papua New Guinean police circles. Neither the Clifford
Report nor the Draper Report supported involving villagers
in law enforcement. The Clifford Report opposed the
proposal by the Ministers of Justice and Police to appoint
village peace officers as RPNGC special constables (Clifford
Report, 261) precisely because such a move would have made
them responsible to the police instead of the community.
The Draper Report opposed the concept of "community
auxiliary policemen" because it would split limited
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financial resources and the ill-trained members would be
ineffective (Draper Report, 126).
The operative assumption by both expatriate advisors
and RPNGC officials is that generalists (i.e., unskilled,
untrained persons) cannot cope with emerging police problems
(Clifford Report, 211). Justice Minister Narokobi recently
challenged that notion, stating:
The increased professionalisation of police and law
enforcement agencies has effectively disempowered' and
disposessed [sic] the people of their right, their duty
also, to be engaged in law enforcement .... I think we
should relook at the role and the function of the
police force in the community and the powers of the
people, of the citizen in terms of his self defence,
ought to be better defined. The power of the police in
relation to the general law and order situation, has
disempowered the people. There is of course a great
need for specialised police but I think the community
and the individual ought to have their role re-
emphasised (Narokobi 1991, 53).
The RPNGC reportedly has embarked on a plan to employ
two thousand men in the police auxiliary for three years to
improve investigation and intelligence reporting on criminal
movements (PACNEWS, 7 February 1991). The RPNGC apparently
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is beginning to appreciate the need to get closer to the
hundreds of communities that make up the Papua New Guinea
polity. In a smomewhat contradictory move, the Government
also plans to introduce compulsory one-year National Guard
service for youths between 13 and 19 years old. The
National Guard, according to PM Nama1iu's March 14 address
to the nation, is intended to help with police work in rural
areas, freeing up police to keep law and order in the towns
and cities (Address 1991, 11-12). It is unclear how the
police are going to keep tabs on their auxiliaries in the
countryside if they are being withdrawn in favor of National
Guard units. These seemingly uncoordinated initiatives
exemplify the difficulty the RPNGC labors under in
attempting to define a coherent strategy for getting closer
to the communities while remaining an alien institution. It
is not a problem that can be resolved as long as the RPNGC
chooses to remain a para-military force that concentrates on
increasing its isolation from the population it is intended
to serve.
Village peace officers have the advantage of knowing
their community, unlike RPNGC constables who come from other
areas. The latter frequently may not know the local
language and are housed apart from the community. The
current, much-bemoaned, RPNGC failure to pursue complaints
and investigations may reflect a simple lack of interest in
the problems of persons belonging to other communities. It
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may also reflect recognition by the RPNGC members themselves
that the legal system's emphasis on individual justice is
inappropriate and unwanted. The Western view that
standardized procedures and records are essential to the
administration of justice is not a valid argument against
devolution of police functions. Justice, as accepted and
supported by individual communities, is essential-- criminal
statistics and other ancillary objectives are not, no matter
how useful they may become once the community has reached a
consensus on how it wishes to treat with lawbreakers.
Village peace officers, of course, could not initially keep
the peace between rival or warring groups, because of their
bias in favor of their home communities. Strong local
peace-keeping institutions nonetheless could serve as a
precursor for more effective regional organizations. It
seems apparent that external security institutions, such as
the RPNGC, can impose law and order only to a limited degree
over most of the country, principally because they lack
community acceptance.
Conclusions
Australian assistance to the RPNGC is channelled into
forms the Australians feel most comfortable with and is
aimed at replicating Australian service standards and
philosophy. It is not surprising the Australians are
repeatedly disappointed, since Melanesian RPNGC personnel
have entirely different backgrounds, interests and abilities
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than those of Australian police officers. The RPNGC is an
institution created to serve the purposes of a integrating,
centralized control bureaucracy--previously the colonial
administration, now the national Papua New Guinea
government. Its para-military heritage is an additional
factor distancing itself from the people it claims to serve.
Analysis of whether the RPNGC is achieving its objectives
usually concentrates on its effectiveness in fighting crime.
If the principal RPNGC goal instead is viewed as extending
national government control and effectiveness, then the
issue of how well it fights crime becomes almost secondary.
Australia is bound to support the RPNGC even if its focus is
not primarily on fighting crime, because the extension of
national government control contributes to Australia's
perceived security interest in having a politically unified
and stable nation on its northern doorstep.
There are additional compelling reasons for Australia
to back the RPNGC as the sole police authority in Papua New
Guinea. Australian police aid is more easily delivered to a
single, nationally-directed, English-speaking institution
such as the RPNGC than it would be to a plethora of
community-oriented, Melanesian Pidgin-speaking village peace
officers. Coupled with the inevitable opposition from their
RPNGC contacts to any proposal that would share RPNGC
resources with others, this virtually guarantees that
Australia will not rock the boat by encouraging the
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devolution of police authority to autonomous village or
community peace officers. Australians also are not
comfortable in general with the concept of decentralized
autonomous police authorities, such as those in the United
States. For example, an Australian author asserts "By
accident of history Australia has been placed at
immeasurable advantage over America by having since the turn
of the century a unified police service." (Swanton 1979,
84). This is a further reason for police officials trained
in the highly centralized Australian tradition to look
askance at any proposal to vest police powers in units not
directly subject to higher authority.
The Papua New Guinea government is rightfully
preoccupied with urban crime and unwilling to weaken one of
its principal security services at a time when a major
challenge to national unity (the Bougainville rebellion) is
still underway. Prospects are therefore dim that village or
community peace officers will be delegated substantial
authority or resources in the near future, even though the
Papua New Guinea Constitution provides for "the conferring
of police powers on persons who are not members of the
Police Force" in section 199 (USP 1983, 184).
Chris Ashton, an Australian freelance journalist who
has advanced the thesis that Papua New Guinea is becoming a
"brooken-backed state" in which the national government
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negotiates with, rather than issues orders to, the provinces
(Andersop 1990, 35-41), elsewhere notes there is an ongoing
"metamorphosis of inherited institutions from Western to
Melanesian purposes." (Ashton 1990, 54). RPNGC
concentration on serving the needs of the national
government, including its own institutional aggrandizement,
may reflect the development of distinctively Melanesian
goals, with little relation to Western values. It is not
necessary to postulate that the entire RPNGC shares a
commitment to national integration; in many cases, lower-
ranking members probably view their jobs as a means of
obtaining access to the cash economy, another Melanesian
goal. The spark of commitment to effective public service
undoubtedly could be fanned more brightly in RPNGC members,
but such is the case with police officers and other public
servants throughout the world.
Shortly after Papua New Guinea's independence, a pair
of Australian academics noted:
Like colonial rule, aid is ethnocentric and
assimilationist. Donors export capital goods and
skills on the assumption that they are superior to
those locally available and that they are needed in
assisting 'development' towards models of social,
economic and political behaviour usually assumed to be
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understood by and acceptable to both governments, but
usually left unstated (Ward and Ballard 1976, 439).
Ward and Ballard then suggest that "the years which follow
independence in Papua New Guinea will see a rendering of the
spatial, social, and political structure of the country as
parts of the Australian overlay are stripped away." (Ibid).
The current convulsions of crime plaguing Papua New Guinea
can be viewed as a grim example of such a process in
progress, with all its attendant human pain and suffering.
If so, one can only hope that the transition to Melanesian
institutions effective at suppressing crime will take place
as soon as possible.
Epilogue
The author wishes to acknowledge the assistance of the
Papua New Guinea section of the Australian International
Development Assistance Bureau in providing copies of the
Millar and Draper Reports, as well as the useful comments
and suggestions of the University of Hawai'i review
committee: Dr. Kiste, Dr. Wesley-Smith and Dr. Hamnett.
The author also wishes to point out that this paper was
written on the basis of research conducted at the University
of Hawai'i, and submitted to the University, prior to his
assignment to the U.S. Embassy in Port Moresby, Papua New
Guinea. None of the information or inferences in this
report should be taken to be based on the author's
subsequent experience in Papua New Guinea.
The statements in this paper are the views of the
author alone, and should not be taken to represent the views
of the United States government or of the U.S. Department of
State.
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